

# MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Oct 07


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# Violence Northwest of Mosul

- 30 SEP IPs discovered bodies of 11 LNs all with gunshot wounds to the head
  - Turned bodies in to local hospital
  - No corroborating CF reporting or indications of time of death
- Age, sex and sect are all unknown at this time
- Executions in Mosul area commonplace until mid-Aug



**Assessment:** Though information is fragmentary GSW to head possibly indicates Sunni extremists attempting to intimidate local population.

# Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV)

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFL//20171001//

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Classified by: MC Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

## Nationwide

**22 September – 28 September 2007**

**Weekly Nationwide**



- 63 ESV attacks
- 102 Deaths

**01 September – 30 September 2007**

**Monthly Nationwide**

- 209 ESV attacks
- 333 Deaths


**Assessment:** *ESV increased during second week of Ramadan due to increase in executions. Majority of attacks occurred in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. Note, Sept monthly ESV attacks lowest since Mar 06; lowest monthly ESV deaths since Jan 06.*



## Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts


### Baghdad District Attacks 15 SEP 07 – 21 SEP 07

Map classified S//REL



### Baghdad District Attacks 22 SEP 07 – 28 SEP 07

Map classified S//REL



**Assessment:** Criminal JAM elements continued displacement, execution activities targeting Sunni local nationals. Second Sunni mosque targeted in West Rashid by JAM SG as they attempt to force displacement from Hayy Saydiyah. Expect continued ESV IVO Hayy Saydiyah after recent mosque attacks, as Sunni/Shi'a extremists struggle for control of faultline area.

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# Intelligence Highlight

- **AQI planning major SVBIED Op targeting American interests in IZ**


- Coordinated attack would begin with CP near FOB Prosperity
- Second SVBIED intended to target American-held buildings in IZ

- **Attack was intended for late-Sep but postponed because of lack of coordination**

- **Baghdad VBIED networks C2 nodes degraded**

- Rusafa in Jun; S. Karkh in Aug
- Impact on communication preventing planned attacks

S/VBIED Attacks in Baghdad Districts in 2007



***Assessment: AQI attempting to target US interests in Iraq in order to force CF withdrawal. Delays demonstrate degradation of networks, inability to adequately coordinate large-scale operations.***

# Continued JAM Surveillance of BIAP/VBC

- Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) officers accept bribes from JAM
  - Preferential hiring of JAM members into ISOF
  - New hires used to provide intelligence on BIAP/CF operations
- JAM affiliated taxi driver reported on CF activity at BIAP/VBC
  - Uses proximity to BIAP to observe CF movements, gain intelligence
- Previous intelligence gathering operations utilized personnel from multiple unnamed sources throughout BIAP



***Assessment:*** Despite Joint initiatives by GoI, CF to identify, remove corrupt JAM members in and around BIAP, JAM continues to adapt their collection methods in order to exploit susceptible personnel within BIAP to conduct surveillance on CF movements and operations.



# Saudi Youth warned Against Traveling for Jihad

- (U) Saudi's Grand Mufti issued fatwa against youths traveling abroad on pretext of Jihad
  - Saudi youths have become a “tool in the hands of foreign agencies that manipulate them in the name of jihad”
- (U) Full support voiced by many Saudi Islamic scholars and officials
  - “the present calls for jihad are made by groups having vested interests and have resulted in Muslims killing each other”
  - “importance of fatwa lies in its influence on the majority of Saudi people, notably fathers and mothers”



(U) Shaykh Abd-al-aziz Bin-abdallah Al Al-shaykh

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## Ba'athist Activity in Tamim Province

- Senior Ba'athist in Iraq leading effort to increase violence in At Tamim in attempt to deny Kurdish control of province.
- Ahmed Hassan Kaka al Ubaydi, former IIS, leads the NBP in Tamim province.
  - Met with Kirkuk, Mosul NBP leadership to coordinate increased VBIED activity in Kirkuk, stress NBP control over insurgency
  - Working with AQI cells and purchasing vehicles to be used for VBIED attacks
- Garnering support from locals
  - Gaining tribal support by insisting movement of Peshmerga south is an attempt to control Sunni tribes



Ahmed Hassan Kaka al Ubaydi

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# Anti-JAM PDoP Faces Challenges

- July, MG Jalil appointed as PDoP to deal with problems in IP
  - MG Jalil fires NIIA members
  - MG Jalil to relocate 2 NP Brigades to Basrah
    - To aid in security situation
- Local IP widely infiltrated by Shi'a militias
- MG Jalil, family, subordinates victims of recent violence
  - MG Jalil's nephew kidnapped from home 29 Sep, released following morning unharmed
  - MG Jalil receives threats
  - Police HQ targeted



***Assessment:*** Assassination attempts likely attributed to JAM, related to firing of NIIA members and new initiatives to improve security. The loss of Gen Jalil would likely have significant impact on level of effectiveness of local ISF.

# AQI Planning Operations for End of Ramadan

- AQI to plan, carry out operation in “last phase” of Ramadan
  - Attempt to take over offices of the Ninawa Governor, PUK, KDP
  - IA bases in Mosul
- No specific attack method reported
- CIOC issued Update 2 to SA on AQI Mosul threat 25 AUG; Update 3 to SA issued 06 OCT



***Assessment:*** AQI has desire to increase high-profile attacks to regain foothold in Northern Iraq. Threat stream building since AUG. Retains capability to conduct VBIED/TBIED attacks against Gol, ISF facilities.



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
## Ramadan Nationwide Attack Trend Assessment



**Assessment:** Total attack levels approximate 2005 rates, well below 2006. Compared to both 2005 and 2006, attacks are more concentrated in northern Iraq, particularly Ninawa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala Provinces; most notable decrease from previous years in Anbar Province. Shift in geographic distribution likely combination of AQI's efforts to maintain freedom of maneuver, significant decrease in ESV compared to 2006, JAM's general adherence to Sadr's "freeze" order, CF/ISF OPS.

## Further Establishment of Jihad and Change Front (JACF)

- (U) 6 SEP 2007 – JACF formation announced
  - Eight Iraqi Insurgent Groups, most notably 1920RB
- (U) 30 SEP - First statement released
- (U) 1 OCT – Second statement
  - Sanctions AMS Sheikh Abdulmalik al-Sadi's call to form united front to expel U.S.
  - JACF will observe instructions and fatwas issued by the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)
  - JACF will also follow advice of “our displaced scholars.”
  - Appeal to other scholars to join the Mujahideen
    - “We are suffering at this time from their lack of contact with us.”
    - “They are more knowledgeable than we are in conducting jihad.”
  - JACF will continue the jihad “so that the occupation will not establish itself in our country”
- (U) 3 October – JACF website observed



Signatures of JACF representation (U)

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# Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV)

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Classified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

## Nationwide

**29 September – 05 October 2007**  
**Weekly Nationwide**

- 48 ESV attacks
- 61 Deaths



**01 October – 05 October 2007**  
**Monthly Nationwide**

- 30 ESV attacks
- 41 Deaths

### Monthly ESV Projections

- 292 ESV attacks
- 629 Deaths

**Assessment:** *ESV attacks, deaths decreased during third week of Ramadan. Majority of attacks occurred in Baghdad. Expect slight increase in Nationwide ESV attacks during last week of Ramadan.*






## Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts


### Baghdad District Attacks 22 SEP 07 – 28 SEP 07

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### Baghdad District Attacks 29 SEP 07 – 05 OCT 07

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**Assessment:** Continued executions including Christians and Shi'as in East Rashid likely conducted by AQI cells IVO Masafee. Reported ESV in majority Shi'a neighborhoods decreased from previous week, indicates possible continued JAM adherence to "freeze". Violence may increase in Sunni neighborhoods during last week of Ramadan as AQI attempts to increase attacks during Nights of Power.

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# Kurdistan Taking Initiative

- (U) Kurdistan Conference on Federalism:

- Masoud Barzani stated he believed Federalism was the answer to Iraq's problems
- Talabani claimed no possibility of an independent Kurdistan

- (U) Kurdistan moving forward on oil deals:

- Nechirvan Barzani displayed concern with the lack of movement on National Hydrocarbon law
- KRG has signed 8 oil sharing deals, expects another 2 in near future
- Nechirvan stated Kurdish oil law allocates the same 83% - 17% profit sharing outlined in oil law draft awaiting CoR approval



Kurdish Region

***(S//REL) Assessment: The KRG is anxious in regards to its economic future. They will continue to pursue investments in the region to ensure economic stability and to encourage movement on the National Hydrocarbons Law.***

## Turkish Government Under Pressure to Conduct CBO

- **(U) 09 OCT- Statement released by Prime Minister Erdogan**
  - Use all measures to end KGK activity
  - Will commit to cross-border operation if necessary
- **(U) Turkish Government under military and public pressure**
  - Recent surge in KGK activity has provoked hard-line stance
  - Turkish government aware CBO might not be effective
  - Few choices in face of recent violence within Turkey




HET carrying a tank near the Turkey-Iraq border.

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## AQI End of Ramadan Surge

- **Reporting of increased AQI threats**
  - Multiple VBIEDs, <sup>1.4b, 1.4d</sup> suicide operatives reportedly in Mosul
- **8-9 October – HP attack volume nationwide increased**
  - Coordinated SVBIED on IP and CLC Leaders in Bayji
  - VBIEDs on CIV in New Baghdad, Rusafa, Adhamiyah
  - VBIEDs on IP in Khalis
  - SVBIED on CIV in Tikrit
  - TBIED on CIV near Samarra
  - SVEST on IP north of Baqubah
- **Ramadan attack volume half of 2006, but attack effectiveness higher**
  - 8 casualties per HP attack in 2006
  - 11 casualties per HP attack in 2007

Ramadan HP Attack Comparison



(S//REL) 06-07 Ramadan HP Trends

***Assessment:*** Increased HP attack volume restricted to short surges. AQI experiencing operational limitations, inability to maintain high OPSTEMPO for long periods. Overall Ramadan attack volume lower due to cumulative effect of CF, ISF targeting and CLC reducing AQI expertise and freedom of maneuver.

## Turks Consider Parliament Approval for Cross-Border Operation

- **(U) Turkish government plans motion in parliament**
  - Likely not approved until after end of Ramadan
  - Parliament must authorize all foreign troop deployments
- **(U) Motion does not equal immediate action**
  - Would authorize CBO for one year
  - Turkish government wants authorization in hand to speed decision-making process, should CBO become necessary




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# AQI Targeting Kurdish Interests

- AQI planning to target KDP HQ in Kirkuk using multiple VBIEDs
  - At least 8 VBIEDs
  - Possibly 12 or 13 October
- Recent HP attacks:
  - 11 Oct SVBIED; PUK Compound in Mosul
  - 11 Oct SVBIED; IP Chief convoy in Kirkuk
  - 10 Oct VBIED; KDP compound IVO Mosul
  - 10 Oct SVBIED; Peshmerga Checkpoint
- CIOC issued situational awareness 11 Oct 07



10 OCT Attack on KDP Compound

**Assessment:** Attack planning likely in response to anti-AQI successes in N Iraq. High profile attack volume elevated nationwide over past several days. Targeting of ISF and regional government likely due to perceived contributions to regional stability.

# OMS/JAM ISCI/Badr Relations

- **Sadr-Hakim agreement**
  - Necessity to respect Iraqi blood
  - Unity of media and cultural efforts
  - Joint committee charged with maintaining order
- **Short-term impact**
  - Foundation for possible means to mitigate violence
- **Long-term impact**
  - Questionable as agreement does not address deeper issues



Sadr and Hakim Meet in Iran

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# Targeting Oil Tanker Drivers for Extortion

- **AQI forces oil tanker drivers to pay fees**
  - AQI in Salah Ad Din charge approx. \$270 per tanker traveling to Turkey, Jordan or Syria yielding minimum of \$240,000 each month
  - AQI in Al Qa'im reportedly charged \$1,000 per tanker traveling to Syria and Jordan
  - Drivers comply out of fear for themselves, their families, or their livelihoods
- **Extortion used to fund insurgent activities**
  - AQI collects most of the money, paying a small fee to “money collectors”
  - Estimated 75% of money collected allegedly sent abroad or smuggled into Syria, Jordan or Egypt



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## Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance

- 11 Oct, Six Sunni Resistance (SR) Groups announce establishment of new political council
  - Membership comprises Jihad & Reformation Front (JARF) as well as Hamas al-Iraq (HAI) and Iraqi Islamic Resistance Front (JAMI)
  - JARF members: Ansar al-Sunna Shari'a Council, Islamic Army of Iraq, Mujahidin Army, and Conquering Army
- 14 point Political Agenda includes reconstruction, resources, Islamic identity, displaced persons, legitimacy of SR. Meets collective SR medium-term goals
  - Calls for end to occupation and annulment of treaties
- JARF & Jihad and Change Front (JACF) are also negotiating to form political alliance. JACF, JARF both have significant ties throughout Sunni community and will seek to exploit these connections



***Assessment: Amalgamation of SR into insurgent councils & political alliances is most recent expression of SR efforts to pre-posture ahead of coalition drawdown. Further consolidation is likely over the next two months. Unification of groups with shared political view will improve Sunni negotiating position, increase CF & Gol ability to pursue engagement & reconciliation avenues with Sunni leaders.***

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# Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV)

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20171015//

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Classified by: MCG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

## 06 October – 12 October 2007 Weekly Nationwide

- 35 ESV attacks
- 71 Deaths

## 01 October – 12 October 2007 Monthly Nationwide



- 71 ESV attacks
- 118 Deaths

## Monthly ESV Projections

- 249 ESV attacks
- 528 Deaths

**Assessment:** *ESV deaths increased nationwide due to effective attacks in Baghdad. Attacks decreased during the last week of Ramadan, reaching lowest weekly total since mid-Feb 06. Although attacks increased slightly during Ramadan, significant rise in attacks never materialized.*

## Nationwide






## Ethno-Sectarian Violence (ESV) Districts


**Baghdad District Attacks 29 SEP 07 – 05 OCT 07**

Map classified ~~S//REL~~



**Baghdad District Attacks 06 OCT 07 – 12 OCT 07**

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**Assessment:** *ESV deaths in Baghdad increased last week due to multiple HP attacks, accounting for 55% of total ESV deaths. Executions continued in East/West Rashid showing continued sectarian divide. Overall ESV attacks remained low as mainstream JAM elements continued to adhere to 'freeze' order. 10<sup>th</sup> consecutive week of less than 61 ESV deaths reported in Baghdad.*

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
# Continued JAM Influence within the Interior Ministry

- JAM connections with Interior Ministry Intelligence
  - Several JAM members operate within NIIA Guest House Complex since early 2007
  - Access to Iraqi classified documents
  - Reported frequent contact with intelligence officials
  - Deliberate efforts by JAM to build intelligence base throughout Karada, Baghdad
- Continued exploitation of Ministry of Interior Resources
  - JAM uses Mol fuel points to project attacks against security checkpoints
  - Vehicles, money & weapons stolen from National Police members by JAM
  - JAM acquires confiscated IEDs and sniper rifles from security forces
  - Government vehicles used by JAM to transport contraband through Iraq

(b)(6)

***Assessment:*** Despite deliberate efforts by Mol leadership to counter militia influence, JAM is able to leverage Mol assets, personnel and resources at the local level to support ongoing operations within Baghdad. Continued JAM influence and infiltration at the lower levels of Mol security forces are degrading aspects of operating capacity to effectively protect the Iraqi population.

## Ramadan Total Attack by Day Comparison



**Assessment:** Total attacks approximated 2005 levels; exception, Ninewa saw highest Ramadan attack levels of last three years. Attacks concentrated along Tigris River Valley between Mosul and Baghdad, in Kirkuk, around Baquba. Expect continued efforts to focus attacks against ISF, civilians, Kurdish political targets in MND-N.

# Attacks Against Southern Belt CLCs

- Sheikh Abd-al-Mun'im requested assistance from Tawafuq Front leader 'Adnan al-Dulaymi for support against AQI
  - According to intel reporting, AQI "overran" Latifiyah on 4 OCT
  - Unit reporting – AQI presence, but reports of "overrun" were exaggerated
- AQI still active in Latifiyah as of 12 OCT, despite quiet appearances
  - 17 OCT attack against CLC sheikh
- 12 OCT, JAM leaders discussed order from Najaf to attack concerned citizens in SE Baghdad
- AQI conducted similar attack in Hawr Rajab with same result, but AQI was unable to reestablish persistent control



***Assessment:*** AQI will continue to mass limited resources to challenge CLCs for local control. CLCs remain important targets for Sunni and Shi'a extremists. Gol support to CLCs remains extremely limited. CLCs will continue to require significant CF support to successfully combat extremism.

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# Possible Threat to Fans During World

## Cup Qualifiers

- Attacks possible targeting Iraqis celebrating during or after World Cup qualifiers vs. Pakistan
  - 22 October 1730C in Lahore, Pakistan
  - 28 October 1400C in Aleppo, Syria
- Crowds provide targets for HP attacks
- Possible threats include VBIEDs, SAF under cover of celebratory fire
- Previous incidents in conjunction with Asia Cup
  - 29 July: 7x casualty-producing celebratory fire events in Baghdad after finals
  - 25 July: 2x VBIED attacks in Baghdad targeting fans, 50x killed, 90x injured
  - 25 July: Celebratory gunfire, 1x CIV killed, 17x CIV injured
  - 21 July: Celebratory gunfire, 2x CIV killed, 56x CIV injured



***Assessment:*** Considering event's significance, effective HP attacks would likely receive widespread domestic, international media attention. Successful HP attack against civilians would likely incite resentment against GoI, CF.



## Harith al-Dhari Issues Fatwa, Criticizes U.S.

- 6 OCT, Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) leader Harith al-Dhari condemns U.S. support for tribal councils like Sahawa al-Anbar, that have been fighting AQI
  - Says “Al-Qaida is one of us, since 90 percent of its members are Iraqi”
  - Calls for dialogue with al-Qaida to avoid excesses against Iraqis
  - Recommends joining efforts to focus fight on occupation forces
- 6 OCT Iraqi Islamic Party leader Abd-al-Karim al-Samarra'i expresses outrage at al-Dhari's statement, condemns his “irresolute position”



AMS Secretary General  
Harith al-Dhari (U)

***Assessment:*** Although al-Dhari paints Sahawa al-Anbar, and the growing number of provincial “awakening councils” as collaborators with the occupation, by publicly siding with AQI, AMS will alienate itself from the Sunni population at large, and Sunni resistance groups that have been openly fighting AQI.

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# Iraqi Police Relationship vital to CLC Movements

- Removal of IP Chief enables reconciliation
  - JAM affiliated chief inhibited efforts
  - Sets stage for synchronized CLC action
  - Opens door for greater economic cooperation
- Joint Coordination Center (JCC)
  - Local sheikhs initiate reconciliation with JCC
  - Logical starting point for coordination of tribes
  - Significant opening for cross-sectarian dialogue



**Assessment:** JCCs could be the medium between CLCs and IPs for shared leadership, oversight, and communication. Groups view each other as competitive stakeholders instead of as complementary forces supporting a common end-state.

## UBL Message to “My Brother Fighters in Iraq”

- New Bin Laden audiotape released
- Addressing Iraqi fighters:
  - Admit mistakes and try to correct them in the interest of unity
  - Gather under one banner so justice can be served
  - We are brothers in faith because we belong to Islam, not a tribe, organization or country
- Addressing tribal, insurgent leaders:
  - Don’t be arrogant; initiate an agreement amongst each other
  - Interests of the Islamic nation surpasses that of a group
  - Strength of faith is in strength of bond between Muslims, not that of a tribe or nationalism
- Addressing scholars and leaders of jihad:
  - Take on role of uniting groups “right now”



***Assessment:*** UBL’s most recent theme is one of unity. Attempt by UBL to re-establish control over fractured Sunni groups in Iraq. Direct response to tribal, CLC successes against AQI. May boost morale for some AQI elements, but limited impact on Sunni insurgency.

## AQI May Attempt Short Surge of High Profile Attacks

- Reporting indicates increased threat of AQI HP attacks
- Threats in multiple cities to CF, ISF, CLC
  - VBIED threat to West Mosul, near courthouse and IP headquarters
  - Multiple VBIED threat to CLC meeting in Tarmiyah
  - IED/VBIED threat to MNF-I, ISF in Latifiyah, Mahmudiyah
- Threat stream similar to early October increase in successful HP attacks
  - Coordinated SVBIED on IP and CLC Leaders in Bayji
  - VBIEDs on CIV in New Baghdad, Rusafa, Tikrit
  - SVEST on IP north of Baqubah



***Assessment: Increased HP attack volume restricted to short surges demonstrates AQI's continued operational limitations, inability to maintain high OPTEMPO for long periods. Short surges likely an attempt to efficiently utilize limited resources to reassert relevance, intimidate local anti-AQI forces, garner media attention.***



## Diyala Concerned Local Citizens Facing Challenges

- **CLCs crucial to Diyala security**
  - Provide Sunnis alternative to AQI
  - Played vital role uprooting AQI
  - Community watch programs preventing AQI from reinfiltrating cities
- **CLCs clashing with Shi'a militias**
  - IP and JAM threatening CLCs for control over areas cleared of AQI
  - JAM influenced PDoP Ghanim failing to integrate Sunni volunteers
- **Sunni extremists infiltrating CLCs**
  - Attempts to discredit and cause friction between CLCs/ISF/CF
  - Infiltration reported by competing CLC groups



***Assessment:*** CLCs critical to long-term security for Diyala. Police Chief's sectarianism threatens recent progress, increases sectarian tensions; could result in AQI resurgence. Battle against AQI requires an honest broker to unite efforts between Sunni CLCs and Shi'a IP.


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## FOB Echo Attacked with IDF

- 24 October, IDF attack on Camp Echo
  - 15 x 120mm mortar rounds
  - 5 x CF WIA, 1x TCN INJ
- CIOC issued SA on 23 October
  - JAM affiliated group planning attack on Camp Echo
- 12 OCT IDF and 15 OCT complex (IDF, Sniper) attacks on Camp Echo and TPB
  - 19 OCT IDF attack on TPB (1 x 81 mm)
- JAM splinter group planning large scale IDF attack on TPB and Camp Echo



1.4c

## Ba'ath Party Webpost Criticizes Federalism Plans

- Response to Ammar al-Hakim's Eid al-Fitr sermon supporting federalism
- Accused al-Hakim of intending to "carve-up" Iraq
- Described intent as a plan of US-Zionist design since 1980's
- Portrayed US as neo-colonialist power, similar to Britain and France

### Ba'ath Party Pronouncements Against Federalism

SEP 10 – Ba'ath party condemns Expulsion of Kirkuk Arabs as prelude to partition

SEP 20 - Ba'ath party accuses US-Iranian tensions as smokescreen To distract attention away from partition of Iraq

SEP 28 - Ba'ath party issued call For resistance to foil the conspiracy by the US to partition Iraq

***Assessment: Ba'ath Party's statement is most recent in series of diatribes in new campaign to attack the perceived implementation of federalism; carefully crafted to be emotional but non-sectarian to appeal to Iraqis' patriotism. Aims for support from both Sunnis fearful of being marginalized in federal Iraq and secular Shia.***

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1.4b, 1.4d

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# Syria receptive to negotiation and cooperation with US

- SY to conditionally cooperate with US request to resume DHS Circuit Rider interviews:
  - US must continue to make donations to SY for humanitarian support; must encourage others to do same
  - Must agree to allow reps from SARG, UNHCR, Gol to attend interviews
- Meeting with UNHCR rep. on 18 OCT
  - SY will not insist on presence of Gol observer
- SY willing to host a visit from AMB Foley




Deputy Foreign Minister  
Miqdad

***Assessment: Syria's willingness to be flexible on the presence of a Gol representative at the DHS interviews demonstrates Syria's potential willingness to cooperate and negotiate with the US and Iraq in an effort to improve diplomatic relations and open the door to future dealings with the US.***

# Fuel Shortages for Baghdad Water


- Fuel shortages at water treatment and pump stations throughout the central region are creating a potential water crisis
  - 33% of distribution network operating efficiently
  - Intimidation of fuel tanker drivers severely impacting fuel deliveries to two pump stations
- DG Ministry of Water Resources recommends increased security
  - Deploy IA as fuel tanker convoy escorts to supply distribution points
  - FPS guards for protection of fuel distribution points, pumping stations and possibly convoys



(U) Baghdad Area Water Pump stations and Fuel Distribution Points

***Assessment:*** Keeping pump stations operational is critical to water supply for agricultural irrigation. Expect protracted disruption to fuel supplies will exacerbate water shortage in Central region, which may impact farming and local markets.

## Post-Ramadan Weekly Attack Trends



**Assessment:** Following slight increase leading up and through mid-Ramadan, attacks resumed long-term downward trend. While fluctuations are likely, expect nationwide attacks to remain at approximately 2005 levels or slightly below.

## VBIED Threat IVO Kirkuk

- 28 OCT, VBIED attack on Sulaymaniyah Passenger Terminal
  - 7 x CIV KIA, 24 x CIV INJ
- Reporting indicates 4x VBIEDs remain prepared for use IVO Kirkuk
  - 2 x Brazilian Pasats, 1 x Red Opel, 1 x Toyota Super
  - CIOC issued SA on 282011 OCT
- KGK threat flyers found in Kirkuk
  - Turkish Forces must pull back from border
  - KGK prepared to blow up all ITF offices in Kirkuk
- Threat report indicating AQI planning multiple VBIED attacks in Kirkuk
  - Targets include Daquq, Shiwan, Lilan PUK and KDP HQs, and Police Stations




***Assessment: VBIED not a typical KGK TTP. More likely AQI effort to increase instability in the region. Likely target of opportunity given current tensions. Kirkuk is a key AQI operating area in N. Iraq.***



## Kidnapping of Diyala Sheikhs

- (U) Sunni and Shi'a tribal sheikhs kidnapped, 28 October
  - Gunmen set up fake CP in Husseinayah/Shabab area
- (U) Returning to Diyala from Baghdad after meeting with PM's tribal advisor
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Reporting indicates Arkan Hasnawi responsible



~~(S//REL)~~ **Assessment:** JAM-SG criminal elements likely carried out kidnapping in order to strike a blow at reconciliation while removing sheikhs involved in the growing CLC movement which has adversely impacted SG activities in Diyala. Hasnawi likely also has financial motivation.



# **BRIEFING SEQUENCE**

## **Tuesday, 30 October 07**

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

- 1. INTEL**
- 2. STRATOPS**
- 3. RFF ROLLUP**
- 4. ENERGY FUSION CELL**
- 5. CASUALTY SUMMARY**
- 6. STRATEGIC EFFECTS COMMUNICATIONS**
- 7. I-ESC**
- 8. MCNS**
- 9. WEATHER**
- 10. MNC-I OPERATIONS ROLLUP**
- 11. MNSTC-I**
- 12. MAC (SCJS)**

**ALL SLIDES ARE DUE NLT ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BUA**

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

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1.4b, 1.4d

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## Jaysh Muhammed Setbacks

- Jaysh Muhammad operates near Mosul and Bayji
- Key JM leaders apprehended, reduced effectiveness
  - Oct 15
    - Abu Firas - JM Commander for Mosul
    - Abu Akram - JM Deputy commander for Mosul
  - July 3
    - Mohammed Jasim Mohammed - JM commander in Mosul and JM spiritual leader for Iraq
- Organizational Disarray
  - Failed plan by Abu Firas to kidnap two coalition soldiers to exchange for MJM
    - Sought AQI assistance in plan
  - Loss of Abu Akram's facilitation of money and arms

RA'AD JABUR MAJID AL ANZI  
(AKA ABU FIRAS)



Rafi' Yunis Mahmud (AKA  
ABU AKRAM)

1.4c

## New Group Looks to Gain Support

- **Iraq National Gathering (ING)**
  - Formed by JAM Special Groups  
Commanders including Akram al-Ka'bi  
and Hajji Shibl
  - Rejects leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr
  - Claims to follow the teachings of Sadiq  
al-Sadr
- Shahmani publicly interested in  
participating in political activities,  
including elections
- Nationalist, inclusive view conflicts with  
Ka'bi's aim of reviving the insurgency  
and his extremist record



Iraq National Gathering  
Official Announcement

1.4c